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GSA’s Commercial Marketplaces Initiative:
Opening Amazon & Other Private
Marketplaces To Direct Purchases By
Government Users
By Christopher Yukins, Abraham Young, Kristen Ittig & Eric Valle*
The U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) opened a new chapter in
public procurement by awarding three contracts—to Amazon Business,
Overstock.com, and Fisher Scientific—that will allow federal users to buy
directly from online electronic marketplaces, with sales anticipated to total
$6 billion annually.1 This proof-of-concept effort, dubbed the “commercial
platforms” initiative by GSA, marks a radical departure from traditional
procurement practices because it will allow individual Government users
(not necessarily procurement officials) to make “micro-purchases” (gener-
ally up to $10,000) using Government purchase cards. By removing the
federal procurement system as an intermediary in the purchasing process,
and in essence outsourcing the selection of available sources to private
providers of electronic platforms, GSA’s initiative has both reshaped
procurement and potentially redrawn a marketplace.
This BRIEFING PAPER reviews the purpose and history of GSA’s commercial
platforms initiative,2 which began with a mandate from Congress to explore
electronic commerce options and evolved through long exchanges with
industry, users, and other stakeholders. In assessing the reasons for the initia-
tive, the PAPER notes a longstanding concern that users’ needs were not being
met by the traditional procurement system. The PAPER discusses GSA’s deci-
sion to steer the initiative to existing commercial platforms and reviews key
elements of the solicitation used to frame the “no-cost” contracts with the
online marketplaces. Because Amazon Business was by far the most
prominent of the awardees—indeed, Amazon had played an ongoing role in
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pressing for the procurement3—and vendors may want to
sell through the commercial platforms to reach federal
customers, this BRIEFING PAPER focuses on Amazon Busi-
ness’ procedures in discussing how vendors might join
the commercial platforms. The PAPER concludes with a
series of Guidelines that vendors and other market partici-
pants might use, as they enter this new corner of the
federal marketplace.
Purposes Of The Initiative
Throughout the commercial platforms initiative, Gov-
ernment policymakers have argued that the purposes of
this initiative—the reasons to open commercial market-
places for direct micro-purchases by Government users—
are to harness mature commercial technologies to reduce
costs and gather more data regarding purchases made for
Government use. But those stated purposes, while cer-
tainly true, do not fully explain why the electronic
marketplaces are being opened to direct purchases by
Government users, largely bypassing the existing federal
procurement system (and procurement officials). The ini-
tiative, for example, could have been redirected differ-
ently, to give only procurement officials access to the
commercial portals. The fact that the initiative was shaped
to give users direct access to the online marketplaces
(albeit access that is structured and supervised) suggests
that there is a deeper purpose here, one tied to the nature
of the procurement market itself: the abiding concern that
users’ needs have not been adequately served by the exist-
ing federal procurement system.4
Traditional public procurement faces a conundrum
because of what economists call an “agency problem”—
the fact that public procurement, unlike a private purchase,
relies on an intermediary (procurement officials, acting as
agents for the principal, the Government) to accomplish
the purchase. As economists have long noted, an agent
almost invariably strays from the principal’s optimal
outcome due to selfish interests.5 Thus in the U.S. federal
procurement system, as in almost all such systems, too
often the equipment or services acquired are not what us-
ers would have chosen themselves. This can occur, for
example, in regular equipment purchased for the military,
because these purchases lack the high visibility (and thus
accountability) of weapons systems purchases, and there
is only a limited feedback system from soldiers to vendors
to ensure consistent high quality.6 As a result, often the
quality of individual military equipment is so poor that
service members prefer to purchase commercially avail-
able substitutes with their own money—often from
electronic marketplaces.7 This opens the door to an obvi-
ous question: why not allow users to purchase directly
from commercial marketplaces, bypassing the flawed
procurement system?
Allowing Government users to purchase directly can
ease the unrecognized costs caused by traditional procure-
ment’s “agency” problem, costs which normally are borne
by individual end-users and are thus (for the most part)
invisible in the procurement system. By empowering in-
dividual end-users in appropriate circumstances to make
individual best value determinations8—which is precisely
what GSA proposes to do in the current initiative—this
new approach could eliminate layers of aggregated
agency costs, (at least arguably) better align purchases
with end-users’ particular preferences, and trade a poten-
tially disinterested purchasing agent for a user informed
by personal experience, who anticipates actually using
the product. Direct purchases also would drive competing
vendors to do better at meeting users’ needs and so should
provide users with improved goods and services. The
outcome of “disintermediation” would be more efficiency
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in the sense of achieving better value for money and more
efficiency (as policymakers have already noted) because
of reduced transaction costs in every purchase.9
Understanding this aspect of the commercial platforms
initiative—the efficiency gains promised by bypassing
the traditional procurement system—has important
ramifications. First and most obviously, it raises a poten-
tial threat to the procurement regime for commercial items
as a whole; GSA has deferred that controversy for now,
by limiting users to micro-purchases that Government
purchase card holders have long been able to make inde-
pendently anyway.
This perspective also helps explain why the Govern-
ment has been willing to adopt a purchasing strategy of
almost instant online purchases by federal users—a strat-
egy that largely abandons the competition, transparency,
and accountability that are hallmarks of traditional
procurement. Because competition, transparency, and ac-
countability (through mechanisms such as bid protests)
were imposed in part to ensure that potentially indifferent
procuring officials (the agents) in fact bought best value,
arguably those devices will not be necessary when the
end-users (who are personally incentivized to achieve
value for money) purchase directly from the new com-
mercial platforms.
Finally, recognizing that this new procurement strategy
relies heavily upon federal users’ incentives to achieve
best value for their own purposes also helps explain the
special requirements that Congress imposed on the com-
mercial platforms initiative. As is discussed in detail
below, in launching this initiative, Congress insisted that
the commercial platforms accommodate the Govern-
ment’s special needs for cybersecurity, socioeconomic
preferences, data aggregation, and excluding corrupt and
incompetent vendors—requirements grounded in the
Government’s institutional goals which (unlike best
value) will not necessarily be shared by individual
purchasers. At the same time, however, as is noted below
Congress stressed that GSA should accommodate the
platforms’ commercial practices as much as possible, at
least arguably so that the broader competitive forces at
work on those platforms can help guide individual pur-
chasers towards achieving best value.
History Of The Initiative
The commercial platforms initiative formally began
with Congress’ direction to GSA under § 846 of the
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal
Year (FY) 2018 to assess electronic commerce options.
After a series of public exchanges and reports, GSA opted
to use existing commercial platforms rather than improv-
ing the Government’s own online catalogues but to limit
purchases on the platforms to micro-purchases. Through-
out this chain of developments, from Congress and
through GSA’s policymaking process and ultimately the
contract solicitation and award, the commercial platforms
initiative evolved in an effort to reconcile existing com-
mercial portals with the Government’s special needs.
Congress’ Launch Of The Initiative
The U.S. Government’s move to embrace electronic
marketplaces began with a mandate from Congress for
GSA to assess e-marketplaces in federal procurement.10
Congress called, in § 846 of the FY 2018 NDAA, for GSA
to establish a program to procure through commercial
e-commerce portals “for purposes of enhancing competi-
tion, expediting procurement, enabling market research,
and ensuring reasonable pricing of commercial
products.”11 GSA was to establish the initiative under
multiple contracts, through phases of planning and mar-
ket analysis and consultations, “with the objective of en-
abling Government-wide use of such portals.”12
GSA was to consult with the market to determine com-
mercial portals’ standard terms and conditions, and “the
degree of customization” for the Government’s needs
“that can occur without creating a Government-unique
portal,” while remaining mindful of “the impact on exist-
ing programs” including GSA’s Multiple Award Schedules
(MAS) contracts, set-asides for small businesses, “and
other preference programs.”13 Congress emphasized the
need to assess supply chain risks relating to specific prod-
uct categories, such as health care products, and the
special “precautions necessary to protect against national
security or cybersecurity threats.”14
Consistent with Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)
Part 12’s preference for commercial items, Congress
emphasized, in § 846, that GSA was, “to the maximum
extent practicable,” to allow sales through the electronic
portals to be made “under the standard terms and condi-
tions of the portal.”15 The accompanying conference
report urged GSA “to resist the urge to make changes to
the existing features, terms and conditions, and business
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models of available e-commerce portals,” and instead to
“demonstrate the government’s willingness to adapt the
way it does business,” and “to be judicious in requesting
exceptions” to normal commercial practices.16
Congress also set guidelines for protecting the federal
supply chain through the electronic portals. GSA was to
establish protocols for “compliance with laws pertaining
to supplier and product screening requirements, data se-
curity, and data analytics.”17 GSA was to rely only on
e-commerce portals that are widely used in the private
sector and that can be configured “to have features that fa-
cilitate the execution of program objectives, including
features related to supplier and product selection that are
frequently updated, an assortment of product and supplier
reviews, invoicing payment, and customer service.”18
Congress made it clear that all procurement laws are
presumptively to apply to the electronic portals, including
the Anti-Deficiency Act (which bars purchases that are
not supported by an appropriation). To facilitate small
business sales through the portals, Congress also deemed
every sale to a small business through a portal “an award
of a prime contract for purposes of the goals established
under. . .the Small Business Act,” and left agencies the
discretion to restrict competition to small business
concerns.19
In response to vendors’ concerns that the firms running
the online portals could exploit their access to vendor
sales data to displace those same vendors, Congress called
for GSA to require that any portal “agree not to sell or
otherwise make available to any third party any informa-
tion pertaining to a product ordered by the Federal
Government through the commercial e-commerce portal
in a manner that identifies the Federal Government” and
to require that the portals “agree not to use, for pricing,
marketing, competitive, or other purposes, any informa-
tion related to a product from a third-party supplier
featured on the commercial e-commerce.”20 Congress fol-
lowed up with § 838 of the NDAA for FY 2019, which
bars misuse of sales data.21
Congress was also concerned that vendors would pay
to be featured on the electronic portals, and thus skew us-
ers’ purchasing preferences. The conference report noted
that Congress was “aware of various fee-based and other
business-to-business arrangements to feature products of-
fered by certain vendors in many commercial e-commerce
portals.”22 The conferees, the report stated, expected GSA
“to ensure that any contract. . .entered into for com-
mercial e-commerce portals under this program preclude
such business-to-business arrangements.”23
Although (as is discussed below) GSA ultimately
decided to limit purchases on the portals to the much
lower micro-purchase threshold (generally $10,000), in
launching the initiative under § 846 Congress would have
allowed purchases up to the simplified acquisition thresh-
old (currently $250,000).24 GSA has recommended that
the micro-purchase threshold be increased to $25,000 for
platforms approved by GSA.25 After an initial three-year
contract period for the e-portals, the U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO) is to submit a report on the
initiative that is to assess (among other things) the impact
on agencies’ ability to meet goals under the Small Busi-
ness Act.
GSA’s Planning & Industry Engagement
GSA initially published a report that noted that the
Government could follow three possible models: to use
commercial marketplaces (such as Amazon); to use the
technology that powers those marketplaces (to use com-
mercial solutions to enhance, for example, GSA’s online
marketplace, gsaadvantage.gov); or, to shop directly from
online vendors.26 In a later report, published in April 2019,
GSA chose to follow the first option first: to launch a pilot
for purchases through commercial electronic
marketplaces.27 Under this approach, GSA would collect
a “referral” fee for sales to Government users through the
online marketplaces,28 while avoiding the costs and risks
of improving Government portals, or of relying on trans-
actions through individual vendors’ websites.
GSA clarified the way forward for the commercial
platforms in a draft request for proposals (RFP) in mid-
2019.29 The draft RFP package confirmed that:
E GSA intended to make awards to multiple com-
mercial e-platform providers that offered diverse
goods and services (not focused on a market niche)
through “no-cost” contracts.
E Orders from these commercial marketplaces would
be under the micro-purchase threshold and thus
largely free from regulatory requirements (includ-
ing the Buy American Act).30
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E Purchasers would use Government purchase cards,
which are available to any Government user with
authorization.31
E GSA estimated that the electronic marketplaces
would cover a market of roughly $6 billion in
federal sales.32
The initial commercial platforms solicitation published
by GSA was challenged in a bid protest at the GAO by
Overstock.com. GAO refused, however, to make the
substance of that protest public, even in redacted form.33
According to press reports, GSA resolved several ad-
ditional agency-level protests (including one by Ama-
zon),34 and then GSA announced that award was delayed
due to the COVID-19 pandemic.35
During this period before award, the procurement com-
munity focused closely on the terms of GSA’s amended
solicitation for the commercial platforms because the so-
licitation offered the best available information on how
these new marketplaces—which could swallow billions
of dollars in federal procurement annually—would be
structured.
GSA’s Solicitation
The solicitation36 that GSA issued in October 2019
underwent several substantial amendments before award
was finally made in June 2020. As this process unfolded,
GSA emphasized that a key goal in the procurement
would be “user experience”—the federal purchaser’s ex-
perience in using an approved commercial platform—
which GSA identified as a “primary adoption driver for
this initiative.”37 This focus on “user experience” echoed
the assumption, discussed above, that the risks of remov-
ing the contracting official/intermediary from the purchas-
ing chain, and radically decreasing transparency and com-
petition, would be outweighed by the gains in user
satisfaction and quality as users were liberated to purchase
directly on their own.
Scope: The solicitation sought commercial platforms
that offer diverse commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)
items.38 “Specialty” marketplaces (for information tech-
nology or healthcare, for example) would not qualify.39
The awardee platforms, though focused on supplies, could
apparently offer both supplies and services40—a vitally
important opening in a broader federal marketplace
dominated by a demand for services.41 Consistent with
Congress’ mandate (discussed above), the commercial
platforms will be available to customers across the
Federal Government. While GSA will partner with other
agencies that are interested in the proof of concept, “GSA
does not intend to limit the e-marketplace platform to just
these ‘proof of concept’ agencies and will allow ‘ad-hoc’
Government buyers to purchase on the platform as long
as they have a GPC [Government Purchase Card].”42
Contractual Structure: GSA’s Amended Statement of
Objectives (SOO) said that each “individual order placed
by an agency through the platform will create a contract
between the agency and the vendor of the ordered prod-
uct(s), separate from the commercial e-marketplace
contract resulting from the RFP.”43 As is discussed below,
this approach—to treat each order as a separate contract—
could have very important ramifications for cybersecurity
compliance, among other legal obligations.44
Because each order through the commercial platforms
will constitute a separate contract, in the Questions and
Answers issued to offerors on November 5, 2019, GSA
agreed (per an offeror’s question) that because “suppliers
are not considered subcontractors to the e-marketplace
providers in customary commercial practice,. . .suppliers
on the marketplace are not subject to flowdown of the
clauses and provisions [included in Sections C and E of
the solicitation], as this would be contrary to the text and
legislative history” of § 846, the enabling legislation. As a
result, those requirements (discussed further below) “are
only applicable to the contract holder,” i.e., the platform
itself.45
To define the obligations of the purchasing user and the
vendor offering goods and services through the com-
mercial platform, each commercial platform will be
required to proffer certain “click-through” text (defined in
Attachment 1 to the solicitation) for every user making a
purchase. The “click-through” text provides that the
submission of an order though the platform “creates a
contract. . .between the provider of the item being
purchased. . .and the Federal agency purchaser.”46 By
entering into that contract, the provider (the seller) will
agree that the click-through terms would take precedence
over any conflicting provisions in either the private
provider’s or the Government purchaser’s standard
documentation. In accordance with federal fiscal law, any
provision requiring a purchasing agency to pay any future
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fees, interest, or legal costs to the seller, or otherwise to
indemnify the seller, will be excluded. Any disputes be-
tween the seller and the Government customer will be
subject to federal law, no arbitration or injunctive relief
can be forced against the federal customer, and (in accor-
dance with normal federal practice) contract performance
is to continue during the pendency of a dispute.
Vendor Data: One of the most controversial issues in
this initiative has been whether the commercial platform
providers will be able to appropriate the data of third-
party vendors on the commercial platforms. Small busi-
nesses and other vendors in the federal market have
voiced concerns that Amazon and other platforms may
use that price and demand data to take over portions of
the federal market, displacing traditional contractors. In
an effort to address these concerns, in § 838 of the NDAA
for FY 2019 Congress said that the platform providers
must agree not to use information “related to a product
from a third-party supplier featured on the commercial
e-commerce portal or the transaction of such product” for
commercial purposes.47
While the platform providers are restricted in their use
of the data generated by purchases across the platforms,
the Government itself expected to benefit from new ac-
cess to purchasing data from the platforms. Section C.8 of
the amended solicitation said that, for “the avoidance of
doubt, the Government shall have unrestricted use of the
data referred to in Section 838 [of the NDAA for FY
2018].” In its press release announcing the awards on June
26, 2020, GSA noted that it expects the data on platform
purchases will help the Government ensure compliance
with socioeconomic requirements, such as “AbilityOne,
small business, and supply chain risk management.” The
amended solicitation noted that a “key intended benefit of
this program is to gain better insight into what is being
purchased under the micro-purchase threshold.” GSA
therefore “seeks purchasing and spend data from
the. . .platform providers, both at the account level (for
buyer’s use) as well as at the platform level (for GSA’s
collection and dissemination out to agencies).”48 “All
data,” said the solicitation, “is owned by the Government
and will be transferred at the end of the contract period.”49
Although the solicitation asked for certain data on a
monthly basis, as “the program matures,” noted GSA, the
Government “intends to make this more of a dynamic feed
for real-time ingestion and will work with the platforms
to ensure it aligns with their commercial practice.”50
Competition, Price Reasonableness, and Quality
Assessments: Because federal users will be able to make
purchases on the approved platforms in a matter of
seconds, without traditional transparency or a formal
competition, as noted, a recurring concern has been that
the purchases could be at unreasonably high prices, of
defective products, or on terms unfavorable to the
Government.
The solicitation did little to require rigorous market
research or competition, and instead left the purchasing
process—potentially for thousands of dollars—in the
hands of the individual federal users. The amended solici-
tation noted that ordering officials “are required to review
similar items and their prices and price related terms and
conditions. . .from at least two suppliers.”51 Through this
limited review, GSA said, “the ordering official has
determined the price of an item selected is reasonable and
results in the best value.”52 The amended solicitation
included a draft user’s guide, which said that the “e-
marketplace platform is expected to provide a means for
the authorized purchase cardholder to document this
review. This function will be useful both for purposes of
review and approval prior to placement of orders and to
maintain a record of purchases.”53
Although the solicitation hinted that prices on the
platforms should be at commercial prices or better54—a
requirement akin to the “most favored customer” require-
ment that has long been the hallmark of GSA’s own
Multiple Award Schedule contracts55—ultimately the so-
licitation indicated that this meant merely that the com-
mercial platforms should be offering Government custom-
ers the same prices that are offered commercial
customers.56
One way to mitigate the risk that Federal Government
users will purchase substandard products on the platforms
is to allow the users to rely upon reviews posted by other
customers—a standard part of modern electronic
purchasing. A draft user’s guide which accompanied the
solicitation cautioned, though, that Government purchas-
ers “shall not post product ratings and vendor reviews
until GSA disseminates guidance for the appropriate
policy and procedures for such reviews.”57 However,
purchasers “may use the existing reviews as part of mar-
ket research prior to the purchase of an item.”58
Qualification of Suppliers: Because federal purchasers
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on the commercial platforms cannot, in practice, use the
traditional means of protecting the Government from per-
formance risk—technical assessments and thorough past
performance reviews—in practice the Federal Govern-
ment may need to rely on a cruder means of protecting
itself from performance risks: exclusion. Traditionally,
the Government would have excluded vendors through a
finding of non-responsibility (by the contracting officer)
or a lack of present responsibility (through suspension or
debarment by a debarring official). But under GSA’s com-
mercial platforms initiative, since the platforms control
the roster of vendors available to federal customers, the
platforms have (to a large extent) taken over the Govern-
ment’s functions of exclusion—though the same concerns
regarding fairness and competition persist.
To make the platforms’ qualification processes plain to
GSA and the vendor community, the solicitation stated
that offerors’ proposals “should describe the
processes. . .to vet 3rd party suppliers. . .taking compe-
tition and supply chain risks into account.” This “vetting
process should be published in a transparent manner on
the e-marketplace platform provider’s site and publicly
disclose all supplier fees associated with selling on the
platform.” This site, the solicitation continued, “will be
used as a reference point by the Government to direct pro-
spective suppliers seeking information about the onboard-
ing process.”59 While these vetting processes are required
to be transparent, the solicitation was explicit that the
platform providers “reserve the right to manage the rules
governing the on-boarding of new suppliers in accordance
with their commercial practices.”60
Under GSA’s solicitation, GSA retained the authority
to require the commercial platform providers to exclude
vendors that have been suspended or debarred by the
Government.61 GSA’s solicitation further provided that
offerors, in their proffered Performance Work Statements
(PWSs), had to “describe [their] ability to accommodate
Government requests. . .to prevent the sale of products
or services to Government buyers that have been excluded
by the Government.”62 If the platforms prevent excluded
vendors from selling to federal customers, this will give
the Government a basic line of defense against corrupt or
incompetent contractors—though it may result in a
substantial increase in debarment actions, if for example
vendors turn to debarment as a primary means to exclude
competitors from this new marketplace.
The GSA solicitation also called for the platforms to
explain how they will “prevent the sale of products or ser-
vices to Government buyers by prohibited vendors.”63 The
solicitation explicitly notes that the platforms will be
subject to § 889 of the NDAA for FY 2019, which prohib-
its executive agencies from entering into a contract with
an entity that uses any equipment, system, or service that
uses covered telecommunications equipment or ser-
vices—most prominently, equipment or services from
Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei Technologies
Company—on or after August 13, 2020.64 An interim rule
published on July 14, 2020, implementing § 889 prohibits
agencies from contracting with entities that use end-
products produced by the covered companies and prohib-
its the use of any equipment, system, or service that uses
covered equipment or services as a substantial or essential
component of any system or as critical technology as part
of any system.65
How § 889 is implemented under the commercial
platforms contracts will be noteworthy. Because under
GSA’s solicitation each offeror was required to submit a
PWS that would explain how the offeror would address,
among other things, cybersecurity and supply chain secu-
rity, and the PWS was to be incorporated into the platform
contract, those PWSs should, in principle, offer important
insights into how § 889’s “Huawei ban” will be imple-
mented by the commercial platforms.66 In fact, however,
the PWSs from the three contractors, which GSA pro-
duced in redacted form in response to a Freedom of Infor-
mation Act (FOIA) request, apparently did not address
§ 889 compliance directly.67 Instead, once the pivotal
interim rule implementing § 889 was issued in July
202068—after the “commercial platforms” contracts were
awarded in June—GSA announced that the “three
awarded e-marketplace platform contracts (Amazon Busi-
ness, Fisher Scientific, Overstock.com) within the Com-
mercial Platforms proof of concept [had] been modified
to include [the] FAR clause” that implemented § 889,
FAR 52.204-25, “Prohibition on Contracting for Certain
Telecommunications and Video Surveillance Services or
Equipment (AUG 2020).” Thus, though the commercial
platform contractors’ offers apparently did not resolve
how the “Huawei ban” would be addressed, their contracts
with GSA ultimately were modified to include the § 889
obligations.
A related issue will be third-party vendors’ compliance
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under § 889. Because each order to a third-party vendor
through the platforms may constitute a separate contract,69
part of the compliance burden of § 889—which falls on
all contractors, including those under micro-purchases70—
may be borne by the third-party vendors selling through
the commercial platforms.
A separate but related question relates to counterfeits
sold on the commercial platforms. As a result of its Janu-
ary 2020 trade deal with China, under which the United
States vowed to find new ways to stop counterfeit goods
in online marketplaces,71 President Trump issued Execu-
tive Order 13,90472 as part of a broader fight to stop
counterfeit goods from China.73 The January 31, 2020 ex-
ecutive order swept up electronic marketplaces (such as
Amazon) in the measures called for to address
counterfeiting. The order noted that it is the U.S. Govern-
ment’s policy to suspend and debar counterfeiters that
“flout the customs law,” for lack of present responsibility.
Those suspended or debarred by Customs & Border
Protection (CBP), said the executive order, should be
“excluded from importation of merchandise into the
United States.”74 The executive order also stated that it “is
the policy of the United States Government that. . .other
entities, including e-commerce platform operators, should
not facilitate importation involving persons who are
suspended or debarred by CBP.”75
In an editorial for CNN, Peter Navarro, a senior White
House trade adviser, followed up on Executive Order
13,904 by warning that the Department of Homeland Se-
curity would move aggressively to combat trafficking in
counterfeits, including by “suspending and debarring
repeat offenders.” Navarro called for private sector “best
practices” to stop counterfeiting, to include “significantly
enhanced third-party marketplace vetting;. . .rapid no-
tice and takedown procedures; and pre-sale identification
of third-party sellers.” Navarro said that the Trump
administration “also wants e-commerce platforms to
provide clearly identifiable country of origin disclosures.”
Navarro warned that these best practices were not meant
as mere suggestions, and that the “federal government
will use all means necessary to encourage rapid adoption
and to monitor progress.”76
The Trump administration’s efforts to enhance cyberse-
curity and stop counterfeits suggest that there may be an
increase in suspension and debarment actions to exclude
third-party vendors from the commercial platforms, in
part because the Government has no other ready means
(e.g., past performance or technical evaluations, responsi-
bility determinations, etc.) to protect itself when federal
users make rapid purchases from the e-commerce
platforms. The Trump administration’s call for exclusion
may be amplified by market incumbents, which may argue
that new firms entering the federal marketplace through
the commercial platforms are not, in fact, presently
responsible.
Socioeconomic Requirements: The U.S. procurement
system sustains a remarkable array of socioeconomic
requirements, including “Buy American” preferences, set-
asides for small and disadvantaged businesses, and many
other requirements grounded in special social, political,
and economic goals. The Federal Government’s special
socioeconomic requirements are of course not part of a
normal commercial marketplace, and so they present an
immediate quandary: how can these socioeconomic
requirements be accommodated as the Government uses a
commercial platform?
The commercial platforms’ obligations to accom-
modate socioeconomic requirements are narrowed be-
cause purchases on the platforms are limited to micro-
purchases; micro-purchases are not subject to small
business set-asides,77 and, under FAR 13.201(d), micro-
purchases “do not require provisions or clauses, except as
provided at [FAR] 13.202 [related to Anti-Deficiency
violations] and [FAR] 32.1110 [related to electronic
payments].” This “paragraph takes precedence over any
other FAR requirement to the contrary, but does not pro-
hibit the use of any clause.”
That does not mean, though, that micro-purchases on
the platforms will be exempt from all socioeconomic
considerations. GSA called for the platforms to allow
purchasers to track purchases from small and disadvan-
taged businesses, and, by their terms, FAR Part 8’s
requirements apply to micro-purchases, including special
requirements under FAR 8.002 regarding the AbilityOne
program (discussed further below).78
As a threshold matter, GSA hoped to allow federal
purchasers to identify and track purchases on the com-
mercial platforms from small and disadvantaged busi-
nesses, so that those sales will “count” towards the
purchasing agencies’ socioeconomic goals. As the solici-
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tation noted, because the enabling legislation (§ 846) “al-
lows agencies to count [purchases] from small business
suppliers toward socioeconomic contracting goals,”79
GSA’s Amended SOO stated that it would be “important”
for the platforms to be able to designate preferred vendors,
preferred items, and items from small businesses.80 The
solicitation further asked offerors to describe “their
capabilities related to identifying the various U.S. Small
Business Administration defined socioeconomic groups,
to include whether products can be filtered on certain
designations.”81 Amended Attachment 5 to the RFP, a
draft user’s guide for the commercial platforms, similarly
said that purchasers “are encouraged to consider items
manufactured or supplied by small businesses when using
the e-marketplace platforms, in accordance with FAR Part
19.”82 An “important Government objective” is “to allow
agencies and users to filter on small business, mandatory
sources (e.g. AbilityOne) and other designations, as well
as the ability to see those designations at the product level,
when available.”83 The offerors’ PWSs, to be incorporated
into the contract, were to address socioeconomic require-
ments such as mandatory use sources.84
The key socioeconomic requirement to be addressed
on the platforms is the AbilityOne program, which, as
noted, applies even to micro-purchases. The AbilityOne
program maintains a “Procurement List” of supplies and
services produced by persons with disabilities; when a
federal agency purchases the listed goods and services,
the purchases generally must be made through the Abili-
tyOne program.85 Supplies or services that are “essentially
the same” (ETS) as supplies or services on the Procure-
ment List are not to be purchased; instead, agencies are to
purchase AbilityOne supplies and services.86 Both listed
supplies and services and those that are “essentially the
same” must be purchased through the program. The
AbilityOne program reports that, through its mandatory-
source procurement, it employs approximately 45,000
people who are blind or have significant disabilities. Ac-
cording to AbilityOne, the program operates at more than
1,000 locations, and runs more than 150 Base Supply
Centers at military and Government installations. The
program reportedly coordinates participation from ap-
proximately 500 nonprofit agencies nationwide, and
roughly $4 billion of AbilityOne products and services
are procured by the Federal Government annually. The
program notes that its largest customer is the Department
of Defense (DOD), which annually procures more than
$2.3 billion of AbilityOne products and services.87
As noted, the micro-purchases to be made through the
GSA commercial platforms are subject to the AbilityOne
mandatory-source requirement. Apparently because of
the practical difficulties in accommodating the mandatory-
source requirement, GSA’s strategies for addressing
AbilityOne goods and services shifted over time. The
original solicitation said that priorities for “use of manda-
tory Government sources requirements” in the FAR,
“particularly FAR 8.002 [AbilityOne and other
mandatory-use sources], FAR 8.004 [non-mandatory
Government sources], and FAR 8.005 [clause calling for
use of AbilityOne],” shall “apply to all purchases made
on the e-commerce marketplace platforms.”88 This strict
requirement was not carried into the amended solicita-
tion, however; instead, the amended solicitation said that
“proposals may indicate how the Mandatory Sources sec-
tions of the Statement of Objectives. . .[regarding]
AbilityOne and ‘Essentially the Same’ Items. . .will be
met within 120 days of award.”89
This new strategy called for the commercial platforms
to identify mandatory-use AbilityOne items for users,
though as noted the platforms could put that capability
into place after award.90 The Amended SOO asked of-
ferors to “describe [their] capabilities to appropriately
mark AbilityOne items and to promote them.”91 The
Amended SOO noted that agencies “are directed not to
buy items that are essentially the same as AbilityOne
products unless the products required are not available
through the AbilityOne program.” The Amended SOO
pointed out that an “important Government objective is
an ability to mark or provide notification of the restriction
ETS [essentially the same] items to Government buyers
and to promote the purchase of the AbilityOne items
instead.” GSA will be “tracking the sale of AbilityOne
items as a key metric for the program.”92
A final socioeconomic issue related to domestic
preferences. As noted, micro-purchases are exempt from
domestic preferences such as “Buy American”
requirements. GSA’s initiative builds on that exemption
and imposes no domestic preferences on purchases
through the commercial platforms.93
Organizational Conflicts of Interest: The U.S. Govern-
ment has long been aggressive in addressing organiza-
tional conflicts of interest (OCIs)94—typically a conflict
of interest which a contractor holds because of competing
commercial ties or obligations.95 Here, GSA’s Amended
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RFP noted that, because OCIs were possible under this
procurement, each offeror had to “disclose any known or
potential OCI which presently exists or may exist at the
time of award.”96 Because contractors are expected to
report on savings that agency customers achieve through
the contractors’ own commercial platforms, the solicita-
tion questions and answers97 asked whether a platform
provider’s assessment of savings, among other things,
would constitute an OCI, and as a result whether these
types of evaluations would be assigned to a third party.
GSA said no and that it would accept the existing com-
mercial practice of platforms assessing and reporting on
their own estimated savings for the Government.98
Fees to GSA: One critical aspect of the commercial
platforms initiative is the fee that will flow to GSA, the
sponsoring agency—a fee of.75% on what GSA has
estimated will be $6 billion in annual sales, or roughly
$45 million annually.99 Because GSA apparently will have
few administrative responsibilities under these contracts,
and limited legal liability for performance failures, these
fees may exceed GSA’s costs. A lucrative arrangement of
this kind could create a strong incentive for GSA (and
other centralized purchasing agencies, at all levels of
Government) to adopt commercial platforms as procure-
ment solutions. If GSA’s fees do substantially exceed its
costs over time, GSA may need to reduce its fee, much as
GSA reduced its Industrial Funding Fee on the GSA
Multiple Award Schedules when it determined that the
revenues from the fee substantially exceeded the agency’s
costs.100 Notably, GSA continues to accumulate an operat-
ing surplus from the Industrial Funding Fee,101 and the
administrative fee under the commercial platforms initia-
tive may provide the same sort of long-term financial sup-
port for the agency.
Splitting Orders: Because users will only be able to
make micro-purchases on the new commercial platforms,
a critical practical and legal issue is whether users will
inappropriately “split” orders to keep them below the dol-
lar cap for micro-purchases (the “micro-purchase
threshold”).102 Past GAO and inspector general reports
have routinely found suspected splitting of orders to avoid
the micro-purchase threshold and inadequate agency
controls to check splitting of requirements.103
DOD guidance on the use of purchase cards treats split-
ting orders as a violation of purchase card policy. Split-
ting occurs when a purchaser “splits a known requirement
at the time of the purchase into several transactions in or-
der to circumvent their authorized dollar thresholds.”104
The DOD guidance treats intentional misuse of purchase
cards by “splitting” purchases to avoid the micro-purchase
threshold as a form of abuse, subject to disciplinary
action.105
Past assessments have concluded that the best answer
to the misuse of micro-purchases is not more rigorous
training, but to make micro-purchase data available
through the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS);
currently, agencies may but need not report micro-
purchase data to the FPDS.106 (The FPDS data is then
made more readily available through a separate website,
USASpending.gov.) One commentator argued that train-
ing alone will not solve the “splitting” problem, and that
therefore the micro-purchase threshold should be in-
creased in order to reduce the burdens that small orders
put on the procurement workforce.107 Another commenta-
tor, Neil Whiteman, argued that the “splitting” that occurs
with purchase cards (which are presumptively used for
micro-purchases) can be adequately addressed only by
including all purchase card data in the public FPDS.108
“The lack of publicly available meaningful purchase card
transaction data precludes investigation into the full extent
and consequences of these abuses,” he wrote almost 20
years ago. “These problems,” he said, “are exacerbated
by the fact that the majority of purchase card use is by
end users in program and field offices (i.e., not procure-
ment professionals trained in the complexities of federal
procurement law and policy).” He concluded that this
“small step—treating relevant data on purchase card
transactions similarly to other small procurements—
would allow meaningful review of the purchase card
program to ensure that it is furthering the Government’s
laws, programs, policies, and goals.”109
The procurement process for the commercial platforms
initiative, from planning through competition, exposed a
number of issues that remained less than fully resolved at
the time of award. It was not clear by the time of award,
for example, how the commercial platform providers and
their third-party vendors would comply fully with new
and very severe bars against purchasing certain banned
products from China. What was clear, however, was that
the new platforms would offer an entirely different ap-
proach to procurement—commercial supply chains
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largely divorced from traditional Government procure-
ment, which would allow federal purchasers to access
commercial solutions directly.
Selling On The Commercial Platforms
After some delay, on June 26, 2020 GSA awarded three
“commercial platforms” contracts, to Amazon Business,
Overstock.com, and Fisher Scientific. Users can now ac-
cess those platforms through an innocuous GSA “landing
page” (reproduced below) which links directly to the
awardee firms’ respective websites. GSA has done little to
publicize the commercial platforms, despite the billions
of dollars of annual sales that GSA has projected for the
platforms.110 As the screen shot below from the GSA
website shows, the “landing page”—the entrance to a
multi-billion-dollar marketplace—is little more than three
links to three commercial marketplaces.111 The question,
then, is how vendors can access these new platforms, to
sell to Government customers.
Many suppliers of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)
items are already selling their products on a business-to-
business e-commerce marketplace.112 For these suppliers,
the transition to GSA’s chosen e-commerce marketplaces
may be as simple as updating their seller profile page, as
burdensome as initially registering to sell on a business-
to-business e-commerce marketplace, or anywhere in
between. For suppliers of COTS items that have not previ-
ously engaged customers through an e-commerce market-
place but that want to sell their products to Federal
Government customers through GSA’s e-commerce
marketplaces, the registration process will likely be
entirely alien. In any case, suppliers need to know how
they can begin selling to the Federal Government through
GSA’s e-commerce marketplaces.
GSA’s solicitation shed some light on the process for
third-party vendors joining the platforms. Specifically, the
solicitation required the selected contractors to “manag[e]
all 3rd party suppliers that operate and sell products on
[their] marketplace,” and specified that the contractors are
“responsible for all supplier vetting, onboarding and or-
der fulfillment.”113 Building on these instructions, the so-
licitation stated: “This vetting process should be published
in a transparent manner on the e-marketplace platform
provider’s site and publicly disclose all supplier fees as-
sociated with selling on the platform.”114 GSA may “direct
prospective suppliers seeking information about the
onboarding process” to the contractor’s site, but GSA
ultimately will not be responsible for onboarding new
suppliers.115 Instead, the solicitation specifically provided
that each contractor has “the right to manage the rules
governing the on-boarding of new suppliers in accordance
with their commercial practices.”116 Put differently, sup-
pliers presumably will register and sell their products to
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the Federal Government through GSA’s commercial
platforms much like those suppliers register and sell their
products through commercial business-to-business
e-commerce marketplaces.
The commercial platforms’PWSs, which were incorpo-
rated into the contracts and released by GSA in redacted
form,117 offer important information on the platforms’ cur-
rent onboarding processes.118 As those PWSs reflect, any
supplier that wishes to sell its products on GSA’s future
e-commerce marketplaces will likely need to (1) register
with the e-commerce marketplace provider, (2) select a
selling plan, and (3) select an order fulfillment plan.
The Amazon Business PWS confirmed that registering
to sell on the Amazon platform will require relatively little
information. The Amazon Business PWS stated:
Amazon’s seller registration and onboarding process is
conducted through Seller Central (https://sellercentral.ama
zon.com/). To sell in the Amazon store, sellers create a
selling account by providing tax identification, a business
name, a bank account, and a credit card. Seller Central also
serves as the primary tool for the seller to manage their
business. Current fees for the seller including Referral,
Fulfillment, Storage, and Seller Subscription fees are
published and updated on Seller Central. An overview of
the registration process is available publicly at: https://serv
ices.amazon.com/sellinegettinR-started.html. Once the ac-
count registration is complete, the seller can access Seller
Central to manage their items and orders.119
A vendor thus will need to provide Amazon with the
vendor’s (1) bank account and routing number, (2) charge-
able credit card, (3) Government-issued national ID, (4)
tax information, and (5) phone number.120 Registering to
sell on GSA’s commercial platforms may require ad-
ditional information, however, as Federal Government
contractors must, at a minimum, register in the System for
Award Management (SAM)121 and, according to the solic-
itation, will have at least their small business size statuses
displayed on the e-marketplace platform.122 Additionally,
the solicitation “seeks the platform provider’s help to add
certain minimal terms and conditions to each individual
order.”123 GSA’s e-commerce marketplace contractors
may ultimately require additional information or certifica-
tions in order to register because they possess “the right to
manage the rules governing the on-boarding of new
suppliers.”124
Typically, after registering on a business-to-business
e-commerce marketplace, a seller must select a selling
plan. For example, Amazon offers two selling plans from
which suppliers can choose: (1) Individual and (2)
Professional. Selling plans come with a variety of features,
benefits, and fees.125 If GSA’s commercial platform
contractors develop new Federal Government-specific
selling plans, the contractors will need to publish such in-
formation “in a transparent manner on the e-marketplace
platform provider’s site [which] will publicly disclose all
supplier fees associated with selling on the platform.”126
Finally, because the solicitation specifies that the
contractor is “responsible for all. . .order fulfillment,”127
suppliers will likely need to select how they will fulfill
orders that federal users place. Business-to-business
e-commerce marketplace providers typically allow sup-
pliers to fulfill orders in two ways: (1) merchant-
fulfillment and (2) fulfillment by the marketplace
provider.128 Merchant-fulfillment means that the supplier
itself stores and ships products directly to customers that
place orders through the e-commerce marketplace.129 For
suppliers that choose to fulfill orders themselves, the
e-commerce marketplace provider may charge shipping
rates based on the type of product the customer purchases
and the shipping service that the customer selects.130
Fulfillment by the marketplace provider, however, means
that platform provider takes responsibility for packaging,
labeling, and shipping products.131 Suppliers that select
this option (1) pay various fees then (2) ship their products
to the marketplace provider, which stores, packages, and
ships the products when a customer places an order.132 In
light of the solicitation’s language making GSA’s
e-commerce marketplace contractors “responsible for
all. . .order fulfillment,”133 it will be interesting to see
whether the selected contractors permit merchant-
fulfillment or require suppliers to select a fulfillment by
the marketplace provider plan.
While it may be relatively easy to access millions of
new customers, including Federal Government agencies,
through e-commerce platforms, there are certain costs as-
sociated with this access. Business-to-business
e-commerce marketplaces charge a variety of fees for the
ability to sell on the marketplace.134 While the solicitation
requires contractors to “publicly disclose all supplier fees
associated with selling on the platform,”135 the responsi-
bility for discovering those fees falls on potential suppli-
ers, which must diligently assess each platform to ensure
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that they are fully aware of all of the costs of doing busi-
ness through the new platforms.
Guidelines
These Guidelines are intended to assist you in under-
standing GSA’s commercial platforms initiative. They are
not, however, a substitute for professional representation
in any specific situation.
1. Vendors should recognize the commercial platforms
for what they are: a very new line of access to federal
customers, bypassing traditional federal procurement
channels and leveraging legal flexibilities for micro-
purchases using Government purchase cards.
2. In accordance with GSA’s exchanges with bidders
during the procurement of the commercial platforms, the
commercial platforms can be used to sell services, as well
as goods, up to the micro-purchase cap (generally
$10,000).136 Guidance from GSA has stated, however, that
services must be “ancillary services affiliated with pur-
chased items,” and must be “allowed per the authorized
cardholder’s agency policy.”137
3. In framing their future strategies for this market seg-
ment, vendors should note that GSA has urged that the
micro-purchase threshold be increased to $25,000 for
GSA-approved platforms.
4. Both agencies and vendors using the commercial
platforms should understand that traditional requirements
of transparency and competition are largely erased on
these new platforms; accountability will depend upon
limited recordkeeping and ad hoc audits.
5. For other governments considering entering into
similar commercial-platform arrangements, it is worth
closely noting the history of this initiative—a history that
shows commercial platforms’ substantial negotiating
power, which they may use to resist government-specific
changes to their normal commercial practices.
6. While the micro-purchases allowed under this initia-
tive are generally exempt from the Federal Government’s
socioeconomic requirements, some requirements—such
as those under the AbilityOne program—do still apply.
7. Both the commercial platforms themselves and the
third-party vendors that sell through the platforms are, it
appears, subject to the requirements of § 889 of the
NDAA for FY 2019, the “Huawei ban,” which raises seri-
ous compliance obligations.
8. Both the Government and other vendors may turn to
debarment as one of the few means of excluding risky
firms from the new commercial platforms.
9. Vendors that want to sell through the new com-
mercial platforms should carefully research and assess the
costs, benefits and procedures of the available platforms.
The commercial platforms’ PWSs demonstrate that the
individual platforms will offer vendors very different ser-
vices and support.138
10. GSA has offered remarkably little public support or
marketing for the newly available commercial platforms,
though taken together these platforms represent a novel
form of federal market access potentially worth billions
of dollars.
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